Governance Math
Quorum · Voting · Override Chains
SignalNetwork governance is mathematically weighted by SignalRank. Decisions require quorum, votes carry rank-proportional weight, and constitutional changes require supermajority approval.
1. Quorum Condition Core
A proposal proceeds only when the cumulative SignalRank of participating nodes meets the quorum threshold.
$$\sum_{u \in Q} \hat{R}_u \geq \Theta$$
$Q$ — set of nodes that have voted
$\hat{R}_u \in [0, 100]$ — normalized SignalRank of voter $u$
$\Theta$ — quorum threshold (proposal-type dependent)
2. Supermajority
For constitutional amendments and structural changes, simple majority is insufficient.
$$\frac{\displaystyle\sum_{u \in Q_\text{yes}} \hat{R}_u}{\displaystyle\sum_{u \in Q} \hat{R}_u} \geq \varphi$$
$\varphi = 0.75$ for Core Principles, Preamble, Bill of Rights, PBC structure changes
$\varphi = 0.51$ for operational protocol changes
3. Participation Rate V2
Low participation can produce unrepresentative outcomes. A participation rate check prevents small-group capture.
$$\text{Participation} = \frac{|Q|}{|V_\text{active}|} \geq \pi_\text{min}$$
$|V_\text{active}|$ — count of non-dormant nodes
$\pi_\text{min}$ — minimum participation rate (e.g., 0.10 = 10% of active nodes must vote)
If participation is below threshold, the vote extends or is voided.
4. Vote Weight Snapshot
Vote weight is captured at the moment of voting, not at proposal close. This prevents rank manipulation during the voting window.
$$w_u^\text{vote} = \hat{R}_u(t_\text{vote})$$
Vote Weight Decay V2
For long-duration proposals, early votes should decay slightly to reflect potentially outdated positions.
$$w_u^\text{effective} = w_u^\text{vote} \cdot e^{-\psi(t_\text{close} - t_\text{vote})}$$
$\psi$ — vote decay rate (very small; only meaningful for proposals open > 30 days)
5. Override Chain (Authority with Provenance)
Override events (banning a node, revoking a claim, parameter changes) require cumulative authority with full provenance.
$$\sum_{u \in Q_k} \hat{R}_u \geq \Theta_k$$
The ledger must show: proposal → witnesses → vote tallies → hashes. Every override is a ledger entry with full chain integrity.
Override Tier Thresholds
$$\Theta_k = \begin{cases} 500 & \text{parameter change (weights, thresholds)} \\ 800 & \text{node ban / forced dormancy} \\ 1200 & \text{protocol amendment} \\ 2000 & \text{constitutional change} \end{cases}$$
Thresholds scale with consequence severity. Constitutional changes require the broadest consensus.
6. Emergency Powers (Denial)
No individual, including the Executor Node, may invoke emergency powers to bypass the governance process. The only exception is infrastructure security (patching vulnerabilities, rotating compromised credentials), which is an operational fix, not a governance change. This is enforced by the absence of an emergency override formula — there is no mathematical path around quorum.
7. Practical Defaults
Quorum $\Theta = 300$ (operational) · $\varphi = 0.75$ (constitutional) · $\pi_\text{min} = 0.10$ · Vote decay $\psi = 0.001$/day · Voting window: 7 days (standard), 30 days (constitutional) · Override thresholds: see tier table above